Adverse selections and microfinance in rural Africa: signalling through environmental services
Summary. Microfinance institutions struggle to identify creditworthy agricultural borrowers in rural Africa because farmers misrepresent their success. This paper uses game theory to show that certified environmental services, particularly carbon credits, can signal genuine farming project viability. Borrowers with certification reveal their actual farming conditions, reducing adverse selection and loan default problems.
Cite this article
Benjamin, E. O.. (2013). Adverse selections and microfinance in rural Africa: signalling through environmental services. Enterprise Development and Microfinance. https://doi.org/10.3362/1755-1986.2013.004
Benjamin, Emmanuel Olatunbosun. “Adverse selections and microfinance in rural Africa: signalling through environmental services.” Enterprise Development and Microfinance, 2013. https://doi.org/10.3362/1755-1986.2013.004.
Benjamin, Emmanuel Olatunbosun. 2013. “Adverse selections and microfinance in rural Africa: signalling through environmental services.” Enterprise Development and Microfinance. https://doi.org/10.3362/1755-1986.2013.004.
@article{benjamin-2013-adverse-selections-microfinance-rural-africa,
title = {Adverse selections and microfinance in rural Africa: signalling through environmental services},
author = {Emmanuel Olatunbosun Benjamin},
journal = {Enterprise Development and Microfinance},
year = {2013},
doi = {10.3362/1755-1986.2013.004},
url = {https://doi.org/10.3362/1755-1986.2013.004}
}
TY - JOUR TI - Adverse selections and microfinance in rural Africa: signalling through environmental services AU - Emmanuel Olatunbosun Benjamin JO - Enterprise Development and Microfinance PY - 2013 DO - 10.3362/1755-1986.2013.004 UR - https://doi.org/10.3362/1755-1986.2013.004 ER -
Details
- DOI
- 10.3362/1755-1986.2013.004
- Countries
- South Africa
- Regions
- Africa
- Categories
- funding, climate-and-environment, food-systems
- Added
- 2026-04-28