The Novelty of Innovation: Competition, Disruption, and Antitrust Policy

Steven Callander, Niko Matouschek · 2021 · Management Science

Summary. This paper develops a model showing that new entrants pursue more novel innovations than incumbents, but are less likely to disrupt established firms. When incumbents can acquire entrants after innovation, the threat of acquisition reduces innovation novelty because entrants optimize for acquisition value rather than bold innovation. The findings suggest strict antitrust enforcement encourages entrepreneurial firms to innovate more boldly.

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Callander, S., & Matouschek, N.. (2021). The Novelty of Innovation: Competition, Disruption, and Antitrust Policy. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4101

@article{callander-2021-novelty-innovation-competition-disruption-antitrust,
  title   = {The Novelty of Innovation: Competition, Disruption, and Antitrust Policy},
  author  = {Steven Callander and Niko Matouschek},
  journal = {Management Science},
  year    = {2021},
  doi     = {10.1287/mnsc.2021.4101},
  url     = {https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4101}
}

TY  - JOUR
TI  - The Novelty of Innovation: Competition, Disruption, and Antitrust Policy
AU  - Steven Callander
AU  - Niko Matouschek
JO  - Management Science
PY  - 2021
DO  - 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4101
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ER  -

Details

DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4101
Countries: United States
Regions: North America
Categories: innovation-theory, policy, general-innovation
Added: 2026-04-28