Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting Disruption

Giulio Federico, Fiona Scott Morton, Carl Shapiro · 2019 · Innovation Policy and the Economy

Summary. Antitrust policy should protect competition because rivalry drives firms to innovate. Horizontal mergers between competitors reduce innovation incentives by eliminating parallel R&D efforts, though merger synergies may offset this harm. Dominant firms may use exclusionary conduct to suppress disruptive competitors, which reduces both the threat of disruption and incumbent incentives to innovate. The authors develop a taxonomy of merger cases and exclusionary strategies using US and EU examples.

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@article{federico-2019-antitrust-innovation-welcoming-protecting-disruption,
  title   = {Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting Disruption},
  author  = {Giulio Federico and Fiona Scott Morton and Carl Shapiro},
  journal = {Innovation Policy and the Economy},
  year    = {2019},
  doi     = {10.1086/705642},
  url     = {https://doi.org/10.1086/705642}
}

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting Disruption
AU  - Giulio Federico
AU  - Fiona Scott Morton
AU  - Carl Shapiro
JO  - Innovation Policy and the Economy
PY  - 2019
DO  - 10.1086/705642
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1086/705642
ER  - 

Details

DOI

10.1086/705642

Countries

United States, European Union

Regions

North America

Categories

policy, innovation-theory, general-innovation

Added

2026-04-28