Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control

Geoffrey Parker, Marshall Van Alstyne · 2017 · Management Science

Summary. This paper develops a mathematical model to determine optimal platform openness and intellectual property duration for business ecosystems. The authors show that closing platforms increases sponsor revenue but limits developer innovation, while longer IP protection increases developer earnings but delays public access to innovations. The model identifies trade-offs between these competing interests and provides guidance for platform strategy, organizational design, and regulatory policy.

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Parker, G., & Alstyne, M. V.. (2017). Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2757

@article{parker-2017-innovation-openness-platform-control,
  title   = {Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control},
  author  = {Geoffrey Parker and Marshall Van Alstyne},
  journal = {Management Science},
  year    = {2017},
  doi     = {10.1287/mnsc.2017.2757},
  url     = {https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2757}
}

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control
AU  - Geoffrey Parker
AU  - Marshall Van Alstyne
JO  - Management Science
PY  - 2017
DO  - 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2757
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2757
ER  -

Details

DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2757
Countries: United States
Regions: North America
Categories: innovation-theory, policy, general-innovation
Added: 2026-04-28